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Public Interest and EU Competition Law 
 
Niamh Dunne* 
 
 
While EU competition law has long be understood as a variety of public 
interest law, the extent to which the rules can be applied directly to 
advance non-economic public interest-oriented goals is more 
contentious. This contribution considers whether and how such 
concerns can be accommodated within the framework of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU. It considers both the conventional approach to 
addressing public interest concerns within the analytical structure of 
the antitrust rules, and also how broader public interest objectives have 
shaped recent EU-level enforcement efforts in three key sectors: the 
liberalising public utilities markets, the pharmaceutical sector, and the 
digital economy. 
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“The function of [the EU competition] rules is precisely to prevent competition 
from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest[.]”1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Competition law has long been understood as a variety of public interest law, broadly 
construed.2 Whether stemming from its capacity to increase the size of the pie available to all, 
or specifically to increase access to necessities for the most vulnerable, the task of taming 
private market power almost inevitably relies upon justifications related to the broader public 
interest.3 Yet in a contemporary landscape where even mainstream scholars are calling for an 
end to capitalism or at least its progressive rethinking,4 the simple pursuit of an economically-
oriented understanding of consumer welfare has faced criticism as being both ill-conceived and 
 
* Associate Professor, LSE Law. Email: N.M.Dunne@lse.ac.uk.  
1 Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige EU:C:2011:83, para. 22. 
2 On this point more generally, see Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law as Public Interest Law, 2 UC IRVINE 
LAW REVIEW 885 (2012). 
3 See, generally, GIULIANO AMATO, ANTITRUST AND THE BOUNDS OF POWER: THE DILEMMA OF LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY IN THE HISTORY OF THE MARKET (1997). 
4 See, e.g., JOSEPH STIGLITZ, PEOPLE, POWER, AND PROFITS: PROGRESSIVE CAPITALISM FOR AN AGE OF 
DISCONTENT (2019); ERIC POSNER & GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY (2018); and WOLFGANG STREECK, HOW WILL CAPITALISM END?: ESSAYS ON 
A FAILING SYSTEM (2016). 
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inadequate.5 This contribution explores the capacity of EU competition law, in particular, to 
pursue more specific public interest objectives over and above its established task of “making 
markets work better.”6  
The term “public interest” is inevitably somewhat nebulous and imprecise. Within the 
EU, the newly-revived debate has been prompted by prohibition of the proposed 
Alstom/Siemens merger,7 a decision heavily criticized by certain Member States on the basis 
that it fails to take due account of wider industrial policy considerations.8 Environmental 
protection and the desirability of ensuring sustainability in modes of production is another area 
of focus,9 chiming with policy debates regarding the necessity to tackle the incipient climate 
crisis. Similarly, concerns about societal inequality,10 unfair labor practices,11 and a host of 
problems associated with the increasingly pervasive digital economy12—from violations of 
 
5 See, e.g. Tim Wu, After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The ‘Protection of Competition’ Standard in Practice, 
COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER No. 14-608 (2018) and Lina Khan, The Ideological Roots of 
America’s Market Power Problem, YALE L.J. FORUM, June 4, 2018. Specifically within the EU context, see 
Ioannis Lianos, Polycentric Competition Law, 71 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 161 (2018) and Anna Gerbrandy, 
Rethinking Competition Law within the European Economic Constitution, 57 J. COMMON MARK. STUD. 127 
(2019). 
6 See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE EU EXPLAINED: COMPETITION. MAKING MARKETS WORK BETTER 
(2017). 
7 See European Commission Press release, Mergers: Commission prohibits Siemens' proposed acquisition of 
Alstom (February 6, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_881.   
8 See, e.g., the joint response of France and Germany, which together launched A Franco-German Manifesto for 
a European industrial policy fit for the 21st Century (February 19, 2019), 
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/F/franco-german-manifesto-for-a-european-industrial-
policy.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2, following the Alstom/Siemens decision. These concerns are discussed 
by Ioannis Lioanos, The Future of Competition Policy in Europe – Some Reflections on the Interaction Between 
Industrial Policy and Competition Law, CLES POLICY PAPER SERIES 1/2019. 
9 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Are Agreements to Address Climate Change Anticompetitive? THE 
REGULATORY REVIEW, September 11, 2019. Specifically in the EU context, see Giorgio Monti & Jotte Mulder, 
Escaping the Clutches of EU Competition Law Pathways to Assess Private Sustainability Initiatives, 42 EUR. 
LAW REV. 635 (2017); Anna Gerbrandy, Solving a Sustainability-Deficit in European Competition Law, 40 
WORLD COMP. 539 (2017); Suzanne Kingston, ‘Competition Law in an Environmental Crisis’ 9 J. EUR. COMP. 
LAW & PRACTICE 517 (2019); and Speech of Margrete Vestager, Competition and Sustainability (October 24, 
2019). 
10 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. 
1 (2015); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and 
its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 235 (2017); and Ioannis Lianos, The Poverty of Competition Law in 
DAMIEN GERARD & IOANNIS LIANOS (EDS.), RECONCILING EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 
FOR COMPETITION LAW? (2019). 
11 See, e.g., Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power, 82 LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 45 (2019); Hiba Hafiz, Labor Antitrust's Paradox, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming, 
2020); Ioannis Lianos, Nicola Countouris & Valerio de Stefano, Rethinking the Competition Law/Labour Law 
Interaction: Promoting a Fairer Labour Market, UCL CENTRE FOR LAW, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY RESEARCH 
PAPER SERIES 3/2019, and OECD, COMPETITION CONCERNS IN LABOUR MARKETS–BACKGROUND NOTE, 
DAF/COMP(2019)2. 
12 See, e.g., Ariel Ezrachi, EU Competition Law Goals and the Digital Economy, OXFORD LEGAL STUDIES 
RESEARCH PAPER No. 17/2018; Renato Nazzini, Online Platforms and Antitrust: Where Do We Go From Here? 
5 ITALIAN ANTITRUST REV. 5 (2018); John M. Newman, ‘Antitrust in Digital Markets’ 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497 
(2019); and BJÖRN LUNDQVIST & MICHAL S. GAL (EDS.), COMPETITION LAW FOR THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 
(2019). 
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data privacy to the spread of fake news—have made their mark in discussions regarding the 
optional scope and goals of contemporary competition law. This article adopts an equally 
expansive definition of public interest, to encompass any application of the competition rules 
which embraces values that extend beyond the conventional (if disputed) wisdom that, “given 
its economic character, competition law aims, in the final analysis, to enhance efficiency.”13 
This article focuses on the EU antitrust rules, namely Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).14 Public interest concerns may feed into 
the enforcement of these rules in multiple ways. Rival economic actors may enter into 
outwardly restrictive agreements in furtherance of non-economic public policy objectives, such 
as the promotion of animal welfare15 or access to justice.16 To what extent can these latter goals 
be taken into account when considering the compatibility of the underlying coordination with 
Article 101? A dominant undertaking may impose a pricing policy which has the effect of both 
foreclosing rivals but also of enhancing social inclusion,17 or conversely one which reflects an 
economically defensible monopoly profit for successful innovation but nonetheless prevents 
access for the most socially precarious.18 The question, again, is whether these wider public 
interest considerations can feed into the otherwise narrowly tailored assessment of whether the 
relevant conduct should be classified as abusive under Article 102. Moreover, where other 
fields of law exist precisely to protect the claimed public interest concerns, such as data 
protection or consumer protection rules, when might (non)compliance with parallel regulatory 
requirements be a pertinent antitrust consideration? 
The conventional wisdom is that Articles 101 and 102 focus on the protection of 
“competition as such.” This comparatively expansive concept links to the role played by the 
competition rules in developing and reinforcing the single market structure but, conversely, 
does not extend to non-economic public interest justifications. Yet EU competition law cannot 
avoid the inconvenient reality that antitrust, if interpreted broadly and without reference to the 
 
13 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C-413/14 P Intel EU:C:2016:788, para. 41. 
14 The extent to which public interest considerations can be accommodated within the EU’s merger control 
regime is explored in detail in another contribution to this special issue, see **. 
15 See, e.g., Jacqueline M Bos, Henk van den Belt & Peter H Feindt, Animal welfare, consumer welfare, and 
competition law: The Dutch debate on the Chicken of Tomorrow, 8 ANIMAL FRONTIERS 20 (2018). 
16 See, e.g., Donald I. Baker, The Superior Court Trial Lawyers Case: A Battle on the Frontier between Politics 
and Antitrust in ELEANOR FOX & DANIEL CRANE (EDS.), ANTITRUST STORIES (2007), discussing efforts among 
legal aid lawyers in D.C. to increase funding for indigent defence work, which ultimately fell afoul of US 
antitrust law in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
17 As was a case in Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission EU:C:2010:603, discussed further in text 
accompanying fn. 69 below. 
18 See, e.g., OECD, EXCESSIVE PRICES IN PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS. BACKGROUND NOTE BY THE 
SECRETARIAT, DAF/COMP(2018)12. 
	4 
underlying context, might serve to inhibit or even prohibit large swathes of activity that the 
average European would consider to be very worthwhile indeed. This article explores this 
tension, considering both the orthodoxy, but also going beyond it to suggest a variety of ways 
in which broader public interest concerns may feed in, more obliquely and typically without 
explicit acknowledgement, to the Commission’s enforcement practice. The resulting legal 
position is quite distinct from the assumption that public interest concerns are accommodated 
within the competition rules primarily through an approach of derogating from application of 
the latter. Yet, the examples considered are both context-specific and less than all-
encompassing in scope, thus demonstrating the continuing difficulty of squaring this ostensibly 
technocratic, keenly focused field of law with more amorphous and disputed public interest 
concerns. 
The purpose here is not to argue for or against greater incorporation of public interest 
considerations within substantive antitrust analysis, although there is plenty of literature which 
does precisely this.19 Rather, the emphasis is the extent to which such concerns can and have 
been incorporated within the current EU legal framework, in particular in light of the nominal 
movement towards a “more economic approach.” The article is structured as follows. Section 
II sets out the wider background to the consideration of public interest within EU competition 
law. Section III outlines the established approach to accommodating such concerns within this 
context, including recognized derogations to the concept of economic activity, the extent to 
which public interest can be accounted for in substantive antitrust analysis or included within 
the exception rules available under Articles 101 and 102, and the possibility of justifying such 
conduct by reference to the State action defense. Section IV takes a different tack, departing 
from this conventional narrative to suggest the de facto recognition of public interest concerns 
in the Commission’s enforcement practice in three areas: public utilities sectors, 
pharmaceutical markets, and the digital economy. Both the achievements and limitations of 
using antitrust law to pursue wider public interest values in these contexts are considered. 
Section V concludes briefly. 
 
II. The Broader Context of Public Interest in EU Competition Law 
 
 
19 Compare, for example, the diverging views of Giorgio Monti, Article 81 EC and Public Policy, 39 COMMON 
MARK. LAW REV. 1057 (2002); CHRISTOPHER TOWNLEY, ARTICLE 81 EC AND PUBLIC POLICY (2009), and 
Okeoghene Odudu, ‘The Wider Concerns of Competition Law’ 30 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 559 (2010). For more 
recent arguments in favour of expanding the ambit of the competition rules, see the scholarship cited in 
footnotes 8-12 above.   
	5 
EU competition law is a complex beast. The same rules apply across what has for most 
of the EU’s history been an ever-expanding range of national jurisdictions and disparate market 
circumstances. Additionally, the Court of Justice approved a plurality of goals from the outset, 
including development of the internal market20 and preservation of structural competition in a 
manner generally considered to reflect Ordoliberal influences.21 The question of the extent to 
which EU competition law can and does pursue a wider spectrum of public interest objectives 
is thus complicated by the complexity of the law itself. This Section considers three 
overarching factors of relevance to the discussion to follow. 
First, EU competition law has, for some time, been undergoing a process of 
modernization and readjustment.22 The system long faced criticism that undue emphasis was 
placed on the protection of competitors at the expense of the wider competition process. 
Largely in response, the past decade or so witnessed a more fulsome embracing of the so-called 
“more economic approach” to antitrust enforcement.23 The cornerstone of this development 
has been the Commission’s adoption of an “anticompetitive foreclosure” standard as the basis 
for intervention.24 While the Court has not (yet) endorsed unequivocally the more economic 
approach, much of its recent jurisprudence reflects a more nuanced understanding both of the 
operation of markets and the optimal role for competition law. In particular, the Court has 
focused its attention principally on behavior that harms competition.25 In bringing EU law more 
directly in line with the consumer welfare paradigm, however, the Commission has essentially 
disclaimed any role for broader public interest considerations.26  
 
20 See, e.g. C-56/64 Consten and Grundig EU:C:1966:41; C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique 
EU:C:2011:649; and, more recently, AT.40134—AB Inbev (Decision of May 13, 2019). 
21 Reiterated in, e.g., Joined Cases C‑501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C‑519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline 
Services Unlimited EU:C:2009:610. The (claimed) Ordoliberal roots of EU competition law are developed most 
famously by DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING 
PROMETHEUS (1998). 
22 See, e.g., REIN WESSELING, THE MODERNISATION OF EC ANTITRUST LAW (2000); and Hussein H. Kassim & 
Kathryn Wright, Revisiting Modernisation: The European Commission, Policy Change and the Reform of EC 
Competition Policy CCP WORKING PAPER No. 07-19 (2007) 
23 See, e.g., ANNE C. WITT, THE MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO EU COMPETITION LAW (2016). 
24 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GUIDANCE ON THE COMMISSION'S ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES IN APPLYING ARTICLE 
82 OF THE EC TREATY TO ABUSIVE EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT BY DOMINANT UNDERTAKINGS (OJ C45/7, 
24.2.2009), hereafter ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES, para.19; and EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GUIDELINES ON 
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS (OJ C130/1, 19.5.2010), para.100. 
25 See, e.g., Cases C-67/13 P Groupement des cartes bancaires v Commission EU:C:2014:2204, in particular 
paras. 50 & 69, and C-345/14 Maxima Latvija EU:C:2015:784 paras. 20-23. Without using the language of 
harm as such, the same logic is implicit in recent Article 102 jurisprudence, see e.g. Cases C-413/14 P Intel v 
Commission EU:C:2017:632 and C-525/16 MEO—Serviços de Comunicações e Multimédia SA v Autoridade da 
Concorrência EU:C:2018:270.  
26 See, in particular, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GUIDELINES ON THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 81(3) OF THE 
TREATY (OJ C 101/97, 27.4.2004), hereafter ARTICLE 81(3) GUIDELINES, para.33. 
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On the other hand, this question is being asked in the wider context of a rapidly shifting 
landscape for EU competition law more generally. Relevant reforms include greater 
“decentralization” of enforcement to national competition authorities27 alongside parallel 
efforts to encourage a culture of private;28 a widespread populist backlash against “neoliberal” 
Europe generally, with searching questions about “the future of Europe”29 as a result; and the 
increasing rhetorical prominence of the notion that competition law should pursue “fair” 
market outcomes, without much indication as to how this slogan fits with established and 
evolving antitrust practice.30 Each of these developments poses challenges to the more 
economic approach, and all have a potential role to play in determining the receptiveness of 
EU competition law to public interest concerns.  
Second, the EU antitrust rules do not exist within a regulatory vacuum, and public 
interest considerations find purchase to a greater or lesser extent within the broader legal 
framework that underpins the single market. There is, first, the wider competition landscape, 
including the State aid rules which constrain the ability of Member States to intervene in 
domestic economies, albeit with limited derogations for public interest type interventions.31 
The internal market rules, similarly, aim to ensure a level playing field for the free movement 
of goods, services, capital, and workers, with a default presumption that State-imposed barriers 
to “market access” contravene EU law.32 The fundamental freedoms nonetheless admit of the 
possibility of departing from this approach to further public interest objectives,33 an amazingly 
 
27 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) NO 1/2003 OF 16 DECEMBER 2002 ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULES ON 
COMPETITION LAID DOWN IN ARTICLES 81 AND 82 OF THE TREATY (OJ L 1/1, 4.1.2003). 
28 See, e.g., DIRECTIVE 2014/104/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 26 NOVEMBER 
2014 ON CERTAIN RULES GOVERNING ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES UNDER NATIONAL LAW FOR INFRINGEMENTS OF THE 
COMPETITION LAW PROVISIONS OF THE MEMBER STATES AND OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (OJ L 349/1, 5.12.2014). 
29 Exemplified by EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WHITE PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE COM(2017)2025 (March 
1, 2017). 
30 A development critically assessed by Alfonso Lamadrid, Competition Law as Fairness, 8 J. OF EUR. COMP. 
LAW & PRACTICE 147 (2017) and Damien Gerard, Fairness in EU Competition Policy: Significance and 
Implications, 9 J. OF EUR. COMP. LAW & PRACTICE 211 (2018). 
31 See, in particular, the prohibition rule in Article 107(1) TFEU, and the various categories of derogations 
recognized in Article 107(2) and 107(3) TFEU. 
32 See, e.g., Cases C-76/90 Säger EU:C:1991:331; C-384/93 Alpine Investments EU:C:1995:126; C-415/93 
Bosman EU:C:1995:463; C-55/94 Gebhard EU:C:1995:411; and C-110/05 Commission v Italy EU:C:2009:66. 
33 In addition to the exceptions mentioned expressly in the Treaty articles, the Court in Cassis de Dijon 
famously recognized a broad category of so-called ‘mandatory requirements’ (in essence, public interest 
considerations) which might justify the disapplication of the fundamental freedoms in appropriate case: see Case 
C-120/78 Rewe v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein EU:C:1979:42, para. 8. 
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broad range of which have been recognized34—provided, however, that the restriction of 
competition entailed is proportionate to the legitimate objective pursued.35  
What is notable is the consistent manner in which public interest concerns are 
approached within this regulatory framework. Whether under the State aid rules or the 
fundamental freedoms, the underlying assumption is that the public interest, broadly construed, 
is best served through open and undistorted competition. To the extent that particular public 
interests may conflict with this free-marketeering vision, the latter may yield in defined 
circumstances. Yet, although EU law is not insensible to public interest considerations, the 
implication is that such concerns are extraordinary phenomena, a derogation from the norm of 
the open and competitive internal market. Accordingly, EU law typically responds to the 
challenge of countervailing public interest concerns, not by accommodating them within its 
regulatory framework, but by carving out space outside the rules, and imposing more or less 
demanding requirements on those which seek to rely upon such derogations.36  
Finally, there is the difficulty of identifying any precise pan-EU “public” interest. 
Indeed, much of the historic rationale for approaching public interest considerations as 
derogations stemmed from the fact that, although EU law mandates the universal acceptance 
of unencumbered competition, there is incomplete harmonisation of other regulatory rules.37 
Member States thus continue to pursue a wide spectrum of differing values. Most basically, 
despite the rhetoric of “ever closer union,” in reality there is no single European “demos.” 
Instead, as the demoicracy concept reflects, EU law is essentially premised on the mutual 
recognition of discrete identities and not their merger.38 Yet EU competition law comprises a 
single set of rules which must be applied, equally and uniformly, across Member States. To the 
extent that public interest considerations are allowed a role here, there accordingly may be 
considerable difficulty in isolating a single consistent understanding of what exactly is in the 
putative public’s interest, with significant scope for competing and conflicting visions.39 
 
34 A particularly helpful discussion is CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU. THE FOUR 
FREEDOMS (2019). 
35 An illuminating discussion of the extent to which may pose a constraint is provided in the Opinion of 
Advocate General Bot in Case C-333/14 Scotch Whisky EU:C:2015:527. 
36 The deeper implications of this approach have been discussed by the author previously in Liberalisation and 
the Pursuit of the Internal Market, 43 EUR. LAW REV. 803 (2018). 
37 See, e.g., Diamond Ashiagbor, Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Welfare Law 
in the Context of EU Market Integration, 19 EUR. L.J. 303 (2013), and Catherine Barnard, EU Employment Law 
and the Social European Model, 67 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 199 (2014). 
38 See Kalypso Nicolaidis, The Idea of European Demoicracy, in JULIE DICKSON & PAVLOS ELEFTHERIADIS 
(EDS.), PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW (2012). 
39 One need only think of the recent emergence of ‘illiberal’ democracy in certain Member States, or the divide 
between countries which have suffered hardship due to EU-mandated austerity policies and those which resent 
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Moreover, and more skeptically, there is often a substantial gulf between what the European 
public, such as it exists, thinks that it wants, and what the Commission thinks that public should 
want. 
 
III. The Orthodox Treatment of Public Interest in EU Competition Law  
 
It is in the context of this multifaceted and somewhat fluid legal framework that our 
exploration of the orthodox approach to claimed public interest considerations begins. 
Although assessment under the EU antitrust rules is attuned to the particular “legal and 
economic context” of a restraint,40 the existing jurisprudence does not provide any direct 
avenue by which these rules may, in themselves, be deployed to pursue discrete public interest 
objectives. As this section explains, to the extent that the latter are pursued by economic 
operators in a manner that triggers antitrust scrutiny it is therefore necessary to derogate from 
application of Articles 101 or 102, whether by classifying the conduct as falling outside the 
scope of “economic activity,” by reference to the specific exceptions provided by Article 
101(3) or the objective justification concept under Article 102, or by overreaching the 
competition rules through the exercise of State action. 
 
(i) The Concept of an ‘Undertaking’ 
Articles 101 and 102 apply only to restrictive behavior by “undertakings.” Although the 
concept was left undefined in the TFEU, the ensuing case-law adopted a so-called functional 
approach,41 which hinges on the identification of an economic activity carried on by the 
defendant,42 namely the provision of goods or services on a relevant market.43 Conversely, 
conduct that escapes the definition of economic activity also escapes scrutiny under the 
antitrust rules. The parameters of the concept of an undertaking thus provide the first potential 
reprieve for public interest-oriented market behavior. 
At first glance, however, the definition of economic activity is remarkably broad, 
meaning that only a limited subset of conduct can potentially be exempted on this basis. Both 
 
having to pick up the tab for Eurozone bailouts, in order to understand the significant potential for divergent 
opinions. 
40 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C-413/14 P Intel v Commission EU:C:2017:632, paras. 72-75, 
and Cartes Bancaires, para. 53. 
41 Okeoghene Odudu, The Meaning of Undertaking within Article 81 EC, 7 CAMB. YEARB. EUR. LEG. STUD. 
211, 212-213 (2005). 
42 Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser EU:C:1991:161. 
43 Case C-218/00 Cisal EU:C:2002:36, para. 23. 
	9 
the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed are, nominally, irrelevant to its 
classification as an undertaking.44 Although the crux of economic activity is the provision of 
goods or services, it is unnecessary for the defendant to be doing so on a for-profit basis: 
instead, “[t]he basic test is…whether the entity in question is engaged in an activity which 
could, at least in principle, be carried on by a private undertaking in order to make profits.”45 
The upshot is that, in theory, a wide range of market actors may constitute undertakings and 
come within the purview of the competition rules, including non-profit entities,46 entities 
created and governed by public law,47 State companies,48 and those encumbered with public 
service obligations that make their operations less competitive than comparable private 
operators.49 
The case law, however, recognizes several broad exceptions to this otherwise all-
encompassing definition. The first is where the underlying impetus for the activity is the pursuit 
of social solidarity, defined as “the inherently uncommercial act of involuntary subsidization 
of one social group by another.”50 Activities benefitting from this exception involve a degree 
of redistribution,51 and typically relate to social welfare provision administered through quasi-
private mechanisms.52 The second exception arises where, although the activity nominally 
consists in the provision of (usually) a service, in substance it reflects “the exercise of official 
authority,”53 and so is more properly understood as an application of public power. Activities 
potentially benefitting from this exception range from air-traffic control services54 to 
environmental monitoring checks55 to the regulation of certain sports.56 A third exception 
relates to the so-called “false self-employed.”57 Generally, independent contractors constitute 
undertakings in their own right under EU competition law.58 Where, however, those individuals 
are in positions of particular vulnerability and dependence in relation to the purchaser of their 
 
44 Höfner and Elser, para. 21. 
45 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-67/96 Albany EU:C:1999:430, para. 311 (emphasis added). 
46 Case C-113/07 P SELEX EU:C:2009:191 
47 Case C-67/96 Albany EU:C:1999:430 
48 Höfner; and Case C-82/01 P Aeroports de Paris EU:C:2002:617 
49 Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glockner EU:C:2001:577, para. 21. 
50 Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly in Case C-70/95 Sodemare EU:C:1997:55, para. 29 (emphasis added). 
51 Case C-159/91 etc. Poucet EU:C:1993:63, para. 10. 
52 Such as a pension fund (e.g. Albany), a health insurance scheme (e.g. Cases C-264/01 etc. AOK 
Bundesverband EU:C:2004:150 and C-437/09 AG2R Prévoyance EU:C:2011:112), maternity insurance scheme 
(e.g. Poucet) or an employers’ liability scheme (e.g. Case C-350/07 Kattner EU:C:2009:127). 
53 Case C-343/95 Cali & Figli EU:C:1997:160, para. 16. 
54 See, e.g., SELEX. 
55 See, e.g., Cali & Figli. 
56 See, e.g., Case C-49/07 MOTOE EU:C:2008:376. 
57 Case C-413/13 FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media EU:C:2014:2411, para. 31.  
58 See, e.g., Case C-309/99 Wouters and Others EU:C:2002:98, paras. 48-49. 
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services, they may fall outside the definition of an undertaking so as to facilitate, for instance, 
collective bargaining in pursuit of better working conditions.59 
Each of these exceptions evinces a distinct public interest character, whether it is to 
advance social solidarity, to further non-market goals such as public safety or environmental 
protection, or to safeguard vulnerable workers. In each instance, moreover, successful 
invocation of the relevant ground for exemption enables the public interest concern to prevail 
in the event of conflict with the competition rules. Yet in line with the discussion above, the 
preferred approach is not to seek to embed such considerations within the substantive antitrust 
analysis, but rather straightforwardly to exclude the latter if necessary, in order to further other, 
putatively incompatible public interests. In this manner, the competition rules recognize the 
importance of non-market concerns, but seek to protect these primarily through an approach of 
exclusion rather than accommodation. 
 
(ii) Accommodating the Public Interest within Substantive Antitrust Analysis 
 Within the realm of economic activity, the competition rules apply with full force. 
Under both Articles 101 and 102, suspect conduct is subject to an objective assessment of its 
impact, likely or actual, upon the functioning of effective competition. Article 101 thus requires 
the identification either of instances of collusion that can be deemed, “by their very nature, 
harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition,”60 or of evidence that “competition 
has in fact been prevented, restricted or distorted to an appreciable extent” as a result.61 The 
concept of abuse under Article 102 hinges upon the ill-defined notion of “recourse to methods 
different from those which condition normal competition,”62 but is similarly aimed, ultimately, 
at dominant firm behavior which may “impair genuine, undistorted competition”.63  
Substantive antitrust assessment, accordingly, focuses squarely on competition 
problems that arise from firm behavior. Although recent case law emphasizes the nuanced, 
context-dependent nature of this exercise, it does not recognize the possibility of excusing 
restrictive practices on the basis that they nonetheless further other socially-valuable goals64—
 
59 As discussed, for instance, by COMPETITION COMMISSIONER MARGRETE VESTAGER, COMPETITION AND 
SUSTAINABILITY (Speech of October 24, 2019). 
60 Cartes Bancaires, para.58. 
61 Cartes Bancaires, para.52. 
62 Case C-85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission EU:C:1979:36, para.91. 
63 Intel, para.135. 
64 The most famous counter-example to this position is the outcome in Case C-309/99 Wouters and Others 
EU:C:2002:98, where the Court apparently accepted that non-competition concerns could feed into the 
determination under Article 101(1). However, it is difficult to argue, particularly following the dismissive 
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or, conversely, of condemning competitive behavior that nonetheless conflicts with such 
values. Even leaving aside the question of public interest considerations, the Court has been 
criticized for an almost pathological focus on “competition as such,” to the point where overall 
consumer welfare-enhancing behavior may nonetheless fall foul of the antitrust rules.65 Against 
such a background, the challenge of accommodating what are essentially non-market public 
values directly within the assessment framework is clear. 
Under both Articles 101 and 102, the subjective intention of defendants is not 
determinative of the objective characterization of their behavior. In particular, any argument 
that a defendant may be motivated by “good” intentions—in the sense that its conduct pursues 
an outcome directly aligned to broader public interest considerations—is not a factor of 
relevance when assessing likely or actual impact from a competition perspective. In BIDS,66 
for instance, the fact that an industry-wide collective reduction in capacity was designed to 
further industrial policy objectives regarding the development of the Irish agricultural sector 
was immaterial to its characterization as a restriction of competition by object.67 The Court in 
Slovakian Banks similarly gave short shrift to claims that the impugned collusion was prompted 
by the necessity to frustrate an unlicensed (and thus presumably unscrupulous) competitor, 
insofar as this did not negate the arrangement’s inherently anticompetitive nature.68 In 
Deutsche Telekom, which concerned a margin squeeze in the telecommunications sector, the 
defendant made a loss on providing residential fixed line access which it cross-subsidized 
through higher call costs. But so too did its competitors, a pricing structure that was directly 
attributable to governmental policy to promote cheap line access on social inclusion grounds. 
Yet, once again, the wider background was deemed irrelevant, so that the defendant was held 
to breach Article 102 by maintaining an “unfair spread” between wholesale and retail prices in 
the fixed line market alone.69  
The extent to which a parallel “bad” intention might equate to an anticompetitive one 
is more complicated. In certain circumstances, the concept of the “legal and economic context” 
 
approach of the Court in Case C-382/12 P MasterCard and Others v Commission EU:C:2014:2201, para. 75, 
that the earlier decision is anything other than confined to its own facts today. 
65 Joined Cases C‑501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C‑519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited 
EU:C:2009:610, para. 63, and Case C‑68/12 Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky v Slovenská sporiteľňa 
(‘Slovakian Banks’)a.s., EU:C:2013:71, para. 18. 
66 Case C-209/07 Beef Industry Development and Barry Brothers EU:C:2008:643. 
67 Arguing, however, that the particular legal and economic context ought to have prompted a rather different 
outcome, see Conor Talbot, Finding a Baseline for Competition Law Enforcement During Crises: Case Study of 
the Irish Beef Proceedings, 18 IRISH J. EUR. LAW 55 (2015). 
68 Case C‑68/12 Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky v Slovenská sporiteľňa a.s. EU:C:2013:71. 
69 Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission EU:C:2010:603. 
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of putatively restrictive behavior may be read sufficiently broadly to take account of breach of 
other social or legal norms. As cases like Telekomunikacja Polska and AstraZeneca 
demonstrate,70 the fact that a defendant has violated or acted contrary to the spirit of other 
regulatory obligations may be considered significant in determining whether the same behavior 
constitutes an antitrust violation. The on-going investigation into alleged collusion between 
carmakers accused of restricting competition in the development of emission cleaning 
technology similarly suggests that congruent public interest concerns (here, environmental 
protection) can feed into the determination of whether more novel forms of potentially 
anticompetitive behavior deserve condemnation as “hard-core” restraints.71  
Yet the competition jurisprudence suggests a skeptical view of parallel public interests 
which involve objectives that are clearly distinct from those of open and undistorted 
competition. Thus in Asnef-Equifax, the Court held, uncompromisingly, that a claimed breach 
of the data protection rules—treated as a fundamental rights issue within EU law72—was 
irrelevant when assessing whether collusion contrary to Article 101 had occurred.73 In 
Siemens/Areva, concerning a non-compete agreement in the nuclear technology sector, the 
Commission made zero reference to the much-disputed nature of the underlying activity, in a 
commitment decision that focused solely on ensuring the competitive health of the sector.74 
And remarkably, across the various competition cases involving products that pose a threat to 
public health, such as alcohol75 or tobacco,76 there is little discussion of the fact that the most 
immediate benefit of greater competition—lower prices—is of dubious value insofar as it 
facilitates greater consumption.77 Conversely, this theme has been explored in detail in the free 
 
70 Discussed in Sections IV(i) and IV(ii) below respectively. 
71 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ANTITRUST: COMMISSION SENDS STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS TO BMW, DAIMLER 
AND VW FOR RESTRICTING COMPETITION ON EMISSION CLEANING TECHNOLOGY (press release of April 5, 2019). 
72 Article 8(1), CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. 
73 Case C‑238/05 Asnef-Equifax v Ausbanc EU:C:2006:734, para. 63.  
74 Case AT.39736—Siemens/Areva (Decision of June 18, 2012). 
75 See, e.g. Cases C-234/89 Delimitis v Henninger Bräu EU:C:1991:91; COMP/37750—French beer market 
(Decision of September 29, 2004); COMP/37766—Netherlands beer market (Decision of April 18, 2007), and 
AT.40134—AB InBev Beer Trade Restrictions (Decision of May 13, 2019). 
76 See, e.g. Cases COMP/38238—Raw Tobacco Spain (Decision of October 20, 2004) and COMP/38281—Raw 
Tobacco Italy (Decision of October 20, 2005). Note, however, the more nuanced approach adopted by the 
domestic court in Sweden in its Swedish Match decision, discussed by Kristian Hugmark & Måns Gottfries, 
Swedish Court Establishes Novel Form of Abuse and Objective Justification—Tobacco Marketing Regulation 
Excused Restriction of Competitors’ Opportunities of Marketing in Coolers Lent to Dealers 10 J. EUR. COMP. 
LAW & PRACTICE 46 (2019). 
77 An interesting discussion, commissioned by DG SANCO, is to be found in LILA RABINOVICH, PHILIPP-
BASTIAN BRUTSCHER, HAN DE VRIES, JAN TIESSEN, JACK CLIFT & ANAIS REDING, THE AFFORDABILITY OF  
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES IN  THE EUROPEAN UNION. UNDERSTANDING THE LINK BETWEEN ALCOHOL 
AFFORDABILITY, CONSUMPTION AND HARMS (2009). 
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movement case-law, most recently in Scotch Whisky.78 The latter provides an interesting 
comparator for the antitrust context, insofar as the State-imposed public health restriction at 
issue comprised minimum pricing rules for alcohol which, unlike an increase in excise duty, 
steers any inflated revenues to sellers rather than the exchequer.  
Moreover, even if parallel wrongfulness may augment or confirm the anticompetitive 
nature of less clear-cut categories of restrictions, it cannot provide a substitute for 
anticompetitive behavior as such. This is exemplified by the limitations of Article 102. 
Although undertakings holding significant market power have a “special responsibility” to 
protect “genuine undistorted competition,”79 this notional duty cannot function to compel 
dominant undertakings to, for instance, switch to more efficient fuel sources, or promote 
diversity within their workforce.80 Indeed, it cannot even, in principle, attack “bigness as such,” 
a revitalized contemporary concern of so-called “hipster antitrust.”81 We see further examples 
of this crucial limitation—i.e. the need to anchor competition enforcement within the 
established framework of the antitrust rules—in relation to the Servier and Facebook cases, 
discussed in Section IV below. 
Finally, it is important to clarify that even when assessment under the antitrust rules 
depends upon a demonstration of anticompetitive impact, this is an ineffective conduit by 
which to introduce public interest considerations. In line with the movement towards a more 
economic approach, there has been a turn away from form-based prohibitions under Articles 
101 and 102, with greater emphasis being placed on what the circumstances of a restraint may 
indicate about its likely or foreseeable effects. The crux of this development, however, is the 
extent to which detrimental market outcomes can be successfully inferred (or otherwise) 
merely from the form that allegedly anticompetitive behavior takes, or whether a more involved 
consideration of the legal and economic context is required. This is distinct from the question 
of whether (actual or presumed) non-market effects can be brought to bear in assessing the 
notional competitive impact of market behavior, which, as discussed above, is in principle 
impossible within the current framework.  
 
(iii) Justifying Anticompetitive Behavior on a Public Interest Basis 
 
78 Case C-333/14 The Scotch Whisky Association EU:C:2015:845. 
79 Case C-322/81 Michelin v Commission EU:C:1983:313, para. 10. 
80 Discussing the limited options for competition policy more broadly in this regard, see OECD GLOBAL FORUM 
ON COMPETITION, ‘COMPETITION POLICY AND GENDER,’ paper by Estefania Santacreu-Vasut and Chris Pike 
(November 29, 2018). 
81 Discussed by, e.g. Marina Lao, No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, 61 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019). 
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 Under both Articles 101 and 102, identifying prima facie anticompetitive conduct is 
merely a first stage in the assessment of legality. Both prohibitions incorporate exception rules 
which enable defendants to justify their behavior in certain circumstances, and here too 
questions of broader public interest may be relevant. Article 101 expressly provides for this 
possibility in its third paragraph, which sets out a fourfold cumulative list of requirements to 
be satisfied in order for the first paragraph prohibition rule to be declared inapplicable. 
Although Article 102 provides no such textual basis, the prohibition on abuse of dominance 
has been interpreted to incorporate the possibility of “objective justification,” which requires 
either a demonstration of countervailing efficiencies stemming from the alleged restraint, or its 
objective necessity.82 Under both provisions, the burden of proof lies with the defendant. The 
key question is the extent to which these exception rules might be relied upon to exempt 
anticompetitive behavior on non-competition-oriented grounds. 
Starting with Article 101(3), the threshold requirement is that the prima facie restrictive 
coordination nonetheless “contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or 
to promoting technical or economic progress.” Earlier case-law read this criterion expansively, 
with the Court accepting that any “considerations connected with the pursuit of the public 
interest” were potentially applicable.83 A myriad of non-competition public interests are 
discernible in older Commission practice, including protection of employment84 and the 
environment,85 and furthering industrial policy86 and regional development.87 Yet in tandem 
with decentralization of the Article 101(3) exception under Regulation 1/2003, the Commission 
in its accompanying Guidelines asserted that the first prong of that rule refers only to “objective 
economic benefits,” that is to say, “efficiency gains.”88 While both cost savings and qualitative 
efficiencies were deemed acceptable,89 this narrower reading appears to foreclose the 
possibility of relying upon Article 101(3) to pursue non-economic public interests. Of course 
the Commission does not “make” EU competition law as such, as the Court has pointed out 
often quite forcefully.90 Yet a comparative absence of case-law from the Court on the 
 
82 Reiterated most recently in Intel, para. 140. See also ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES, paras. 28-31. 
83 Case T-528/93 etc. Métropole v Commission EU:T:1996:99, para. 118 
84 See, e.g. Case 26/76 Metro EU:C:1977:167. 
85 See, e.g. CEDED (OJ L187/47, 26/07/2000). 
86 See, e.g., Stichting Baksteen (OJ L131/15, 26/05/1994). 
87 See, e.g. Ford/Volkswagen (OJ C20/14, 28/01/1993). 
88 ARTICLE 81(3) GUIDELINES, para. 33. 
89 ARTICLE 81(3) GUIDELINES, para. 59. 
90 See, e.g., Case T-286/09 Intel v Commission EU:T:2014:547. 
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application of the exception rule since publication of the 2004 Guidelines91 means that the 
Commission’s somewhat leftfield approach has remained unchallenged and thus 
unconfirmed—or refuted. A recent survey of enforcement practice at national level revealed a 
rather mixed bag, whereby domestic competition authorities have adopted differing views on 
the extent to which they must and shall follow the Commission’s interpretation.92 This 
correlates, arguably, with the dilemma highlighted in Section II regarding the practical 
impossibility of identifying a single European “public” interest here. 
In any event, even if Article 101(3) continues to encompass non-economic public 
interests in the more economic era, it requires more than merely identifying such a 
countervailing concern. Additionally, any consumers “directly or likely affected”93 must 
receive a “fair share of the resulting benefit.” This criterion may be difficult to satisfy, in 
particular where certain consumers suffer the immediate detriment (through, for example, 
higher prices), but society as a whole sees the benefit (through, for example, a cleaner 
environment). The restraints must also be indispensable—meaning “reasonably necessary”94—
to the underlying legitimate objective, and must not entail the risk of longer term harm to the 
overall competitive process. Again, the difficulty of applying these criteria in the context of 
non-economic public interest is that it may require the balancing of “essentially 
incomparable”95 phenomena. Whereas one can, fairly readily, assess the overall impact on 
consumer welfare of behavior that both harms one dimension of efficiency and enhances 
another, it is more difficult to determine what degree of enhanced private market power is 
proportionate to secure cleaner air, for instance, or more humane farming practices. 
Although the Court has repeatedly recognized the possibility of invoking objective 
justification under Article 102, the parameters of this exception are less well defined. It is not 
beyond the realm of possibility that a claim of objective necessity might be successfully 
invoked on a public interest basis: for instance, to justify a refusal to continue to supply access 
to an indispensable but highly polluting input controlled by a dominant firm.96 Such a scenario 
is perhaps farfetched, however, and the Commission’s guidance on Article 102 cautions that, 
 
91 David Bailey, Reinvigorating the role of Article 101(3) under Regulation 1/2003, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 111 
(2016). 
92 Or Brook, Struggling With Article 101(3) TFEU: Diverging Approaches of The Commission, EU Courts, and 
Five Competition Authorities, 56 COMMON MARK. LAW REV. 121 (2019). 
93 ARTICLE 81(3) GUIDELINES, para. 85. 
94 ARTICLE 81(3) GUIDELINES, para. 73. 
95 How the task was described, in the context of the internal market rules, by the UK Supreme Court in Scotch 
Whisky Association and others v The Lord Advocate and another [2017] UKSC 76, para. 48. 
96 A refusal to supply access to an “indispensable” input may, otherwise, amount to an abuse of dominance 
contrary to Article 102 in line with the criteria established in the Bronner case: see fn. 123 below. 
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normally, it is the task of public authorities to make public interest-oriented determinations of 
this sort.97 The second avenue by which a firm may potentially seek to objectively justify its 
behavior is by demonstrating that any anticompetitive effects “may be counterbalanced, or 
outweighed, by advantages in terms of efficiency which also benefit the consumer,”98 an 
approach that would appear to exclude non-economic public interest concerns.99 A possible 
explanation for this limitation is that firms acting unilaterally are likely to have less need, or at 
least less plausible motivation, to depart from normal methods of competition to further non-
profit-oriented public interest objectives. As discussed in Section IV, however, the opposite is 
not the case, and it will be suggested below that public interest concerns may conversely 
function to flesh out the amorphous ‘special responsibility’ of dominant firms in certain 
instances. 
 
(iv) Overreaching Antitrust in the Public Interest: State Action and Beyond 
 Finally, even if behavior is classified as economic activity, is held to be restrictive of 
competition, and cannot be justified by the defendant(s), a further option is available by which, 
potentially, to reflect public interest concerns. It was noted in the preceding paragraph that the 
Commission is generally wary of claims that private undertakings can accurately isolate and 
enforce the notional “public” interest.100 Conversely, where ostensible private economic 
activity is in fact required by State regulation, then EU competition law recognizes a defense 
from liability for the undertakings concerned.101 Such an exception similarly arises where the 
extent of existing public regulation within the notional market renders independent competitive 
conduct impossible, thus similarly precluding anticompetitive activity from arising.102 The 
“State action” defense thus provides potential cover for economic activity that restricts 
competition in furtherance of public interest objectives—but only where, crucially, the 
requisite degree of State involvement is demonstrated. 
The difficulty of relying upon this exception in practice—again, notably, a derogation 
from the ordinary competition rules—is that the existing jurisprudence interprets the 
 
97 ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES, para.29. 
98 Intel, para. 140. See also ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES, para.30. 
99 The Commission sums up this exception as requiring ‘a weighing-up of any apparent anti-competitive effects 
against any advanced and substantiated efficiencies [in order to determine whether the conduct] is likely to 
result in consumer harm.’ See ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES, para.31. 
100 See fn. 97 above. This point was also emphasized by the Court of Justice in the Slovakian Banks case, where 
it asserted that, generally, ‘it is for public authorities and not private undertakings or associations of 
undertakings to ensure compliance with statutory requirements’ (para. 20). 
101 Case C-359/95 P Commission and France v Ladbroke Racing EU:C:1997:531, para. 33-35. 
102 An interesting example of which arose in Case T‑360/09 E.ON Ruhrgas AG EU:T:2012:332. 
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application of the State action defense in an incredibly narrow fashion. In short, it is only if the 
existing regulatory framework removes all scope for freedom of market action from the 
defendant that application of the competition rules is excluded. Thus, in BIDS, the fact that the 
collective scheme had been developed and implemented with the express support of the 
ministry for agriculture was irrelevant to its treatment under Article 101, since the undertakings 
had entered into it voluntarily.103 More radically, in Deutsche Telekom, the wholesale and retail 
price levels that comprised the margin squeeze were both approved by the sector regulator. Yet 
the Court refused application of the State action defense because the defendant nonetheless 
retained scope to lobby the regulator and seek a variation of the pricing spread.104 Thus, the 
fact that the public interest objectives pursued by private parties coincide with public interests 
recognized by the State, or even that the State approves of and encourages the pursuit of such 
objectives through private means, cannot in itself serve to immunize private conduct from 
antitrust scrutiny. There are good reasons for a rigid approach to the State action defense, 
including the need to avoid its strategic misuse. But the upshot is that it is difficult, not only to 
carve space within the EU competition framework for public interest-oriented behavior of a 
wholly private nature, but also for behavior that has a more plausibly public character. 
A further derogation is found in Article 106(2) TFEU, which exempts from application 
of, inter alia, the competition rules the provision by undertakings of “services of general 
economic interest” (SGEIs) in certain circumstances. The SGEI concept corresponds broadly 
to most domestic notions of “public service,”105 and the Article 106(2) exception enables 
Member States to opt-out of elements of the “open and competitive” internal market to achieve 
defined public interest goals at national level.106 What is notable, for our purpose, is that as a 
derogation from the general application of EU law, the Article 106(2) exception should in 
principle be strictly interpreted. Yet Member States have been given a fairly free hand in 
determining the categories of service that fall within the SGEI concept in their jurisdiction, and 
are thus immunized from application of the competition rules.107 This, arguably, reflects a 
rather pragmatic choice to accommodate domestic welfare provision with the strictures 
 
103 See fn. 66 above. 
104 Deutsche Telekom, paras. 81-96. 
105 JOSE LUIS BUENDIA SIERRA, EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS AND STATE MONOPOLIES UNDER EC LAW (1999), para.8.31. 
106 Case C-320/91 Corbeau EU:C:1993:198, para. 14. 
107 See discussion in JONATHAN FAULL & ALI NIKPAY (EDS.), FAULL AND NIKPAY: THE EU LAW OF 
COMPETITION, 3RD ED. (2014), 6.176, and the approach in cases such as Corbeau, Cases C-393/92 Almelo 
EU:C:1994:171, C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner EU:C:2001:577, and C-419/02 BUPA EU:C:2006:122. 
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imposed by EU law, in order to avoid potentially destabilizing conflicts with national 
governments on this point.108 
 
IV. The Public Interest in Practice in EU Competition Law 
 
 The preceding section described an apparent dichotomy in terms of the treatment of 
public interest considerations within EU competition law. The substantive rules are largely 
indifferent to such concerns, beyond the trite assumption that enhancing consumer welfare is 
in the public interest. Yet if interpreted broadly and without reference to the underlying context, 
competition law might obstruct large swathes of activity that the average European would 
consider to be entirely worthwhile. The competition framework deals with this dilemma, 
largely, by carving out such conduct from the substantive scope of the rules: whether ex ante 
by removing it entirely from the concept of economic activity, or through the ex post 
deployment of an exception rule or the State action defense. The coverage of these derogations 
is less than complete, however, meaning that the competition rules still occasionally come into 
conflict with non-economic public interest concerns: a position that contributes to the rather 
unfair characterization of the EU as a “liberalisation machine.”109 Yet, this article’s account 
has been straightforward: tightly focused competition concerns on the one side, public interest-
oriented derogations on the other. 
As this penultimate section demonstrates, however, the reality is more complex. 
Despite a veneer of technocracy that envelopes contemporary enforcement, antitrust remains a 
highly political field of law,110 and the Commission, moreover, an inescapably political 
entity.111 Accordingly, even if EU competition law actively disclaims any direct role for public 
interest considerations within its substantive core, the competition rules can be—and not 
infrequently are—deployed in a manner that reflects a distinct understanding of how best to 
advance the public interest, broadly understood. Competition law has two main advantages 
within the wider framework of EU law in this regard. First, it can be enforced by the 
Commission acting alone, without positive approval from the Parliament and Council. It thus 
 
108 A useful discussion is Heike Schweitzer, Services of General Economic Interest: European Law’s Impact on 
the Role of Markets and of Member States, in MARISE CREMONA (ED.) MARKET INTEGRATION AND PUBLIC 
SERVICES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011). 
109 KAREL VAN MIERT, L’EUROPE, VECTEUR DE LA LIBERALISATION (Paris, Speech of October 21, 1996). 
110 See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979), and writing 
more recently, Ariel Ezrachi, Sponge, 5 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 49 (2017). 
111 See, e.g., Ian S. Forrester, ‘Due process in EC competition cases: A distinguished institution with flawed 
procedures’ 34 EUR. LAW REV. 817 (2009). 
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provides a more effective tool by which to address contentious issues that may struggle to reach 
the level of consensus required for direct legislative intervention.112 Second, the competition 
rules themselves are comparatively wide-ranging and amorphous; if not exactly a “blank 
cheque”113 for enforcers, then certainly amenable to progressive development and 
reinterpretation in light of changing market circumstances. Accordingly, even if it remains 
necessary, when applying competition law in furtherance of public interest objectives, to make 
a connection to the functioning of market competition, there is scope to bring the wider context 
to bear in doing so: what Ezrachi describes as antitrust’s “sponge-like” qualities.114 
There are two main ways in which broader public interest concerns are manifested in 
EU-level enforcement. First, there is the mere fact of concentrating recurrent activity in a 
particular area or in pursuit of particular objectives, which suggests the existence of a distinct 
“Union interest.”115 Three areas of recent focus by the Commission are considered below: 
liberalising utilities markets, pharmaceutical markets, and the digital economy. In addition, and 
more contestably, the theories of harm that have been developed in such cases often 
demonstrate a progressive, occasionally contentious, approach to the competition rules. As will 
be explored below, where obvious issues of public interest are at stake, this may provide an 
impetus towards expansion or innovation in the antitrust context. Thus, although EU 
competition law is not a vehicle by which the public interest can be pursued directly, public 
interest concerns may feed into the Commission’s approach to enforcement: resulting in more 
ambitious (and disputable) theories of harm, and often marking a departure from the strict—
and restrictive—logic of the “more economic approach.”  
In the remainder of this section, we consider our three examples in detail. The purpose 
is more descriptive than normative. The aim is neither to suggest that competition law should 
be redirected towards the pursuit of non-competition public interest goals, nor that it invariably 
is. It will, however, be argued that the very particular public interests at stake in each example 
is apparent in the manner in which the Commission has approached its caseload in these areas, 
and in how the underlying legal rules are developed and expanded as a result. Accordingly, 
these examples provide a more granular picture of the relationship between competition 
 
112 Jonathan Zeitlin, Francesco Nicoli & Brigid Laffan, Introduction: the European Union beyond the 
polycrisis? Integration and politicisation in an age of shifting cleavages, 26 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 963, 972 
(2019). 
113 Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1702 (1986). 
114 Ariel Ezrachi, Sponge, 5 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 49 (2017). 
115 See, e.g., Case T-64/89 Automec v Commission EU:T:1990:42 and Enforcement Priorities, para. 3 on this 
point. 
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enforcement and non-competition public interests than the orthodoxy outlined in the preceding 
section otherwise suggests. 
 
(i) Competition law and the Pursuit of Market Liberalisation 
 The first area where a distinct “public interest” flavor to Commission enforcement is 
discernible is in support of the EU-level liberalisation policies which have been pursued, most 
obviously, in telecommunications and energy markets in the past several decades. The 
desirability, indeed the inevitability, of liberalising these typically State-owned monopoly 
sectors has long been a tenet of faith within the Commission, and competition enforcement 
commingles with increasingly demanding legislative efforts in this sphere.116 The public 
interest here has several dimensions. There is, clearly, a public interest in securing cheaper 
better-quality access to objectively necessary services like broadband, electricity, central 
heating, and public transport. This enhances consumer welfare in general but can also have 
significant redistributive impact: lower energy prices can provide market-based solutions to 
alleviate fuel poverty, for instance, while increased competition in telecommunications may 
encourage more rapid broadband expansion in under-served geographic regions. Yet this strand 
of case-law also aligns with more dogmatic assumptions regarding the optional development 
of the internal market: a perception that “there is no alternative to the liberalisation process.”117 
Accordingly, the focus on liberalized utilities markets also represents a more doctrinaire, 
disputed view about how such sectors ought to be structured and to function within the internal 
market.118 The public interest at stake is thus not merely the desirability of securing cheaper 
and better services for (the most vulnerable) consumers; it moreover reflects the assumed 
societal value of the fully realized process of economic integration itself.119 
 
116 Antitrust enforcement in these sectors runs alongside a complex mesh of EU-level legislation which has 
mandated a top-down, iterative process of market liberalisation, including structural reorganisation (unbundling) 
and mandatory access duties. This includes, in the telecommunications sector, DIRECTIVES 2002/19/EC (OJ 
L108/7, 24.4.2002), 2002/21/EC (OJ C108/33, 24.4.2002), 2002/20/EC (OJ L108/21, 24.4.2002), 2002/77/EC 
(OJ L249/21, 17.9.2002) and 2009/140/EC (OJ L337/37, 18/12/2009); and in the energy sector, DIRECTIVE 
2009/72/EC (OJ L211/55, 14.8.2009) and Directive 2009/73/EC (OJ L211/94, 14.8.2009). 
117 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG COMPETITION REPORT ON ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY (SEC(2006)1724), 
published January 10, 2007, p. 4. 
118 A critical discussion is MASSIMO FLORIO, NETWORK INDUSTRIES AND SOCIAL WELFARE. THE EXPERIMENT 
THAT RESHUFFLED EUROPEAN UTILITIES (2013). 
119 A more general critique is FRITZ SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE (1999). 
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The first indicator of a distinct public interest is the sheer weight of cases that have been 
pursued within the telecommunications120 and energy121 sectors. Yet the mere fact that the 
Commission brings many cases tells us little about its approach to the public interest issues at 
stake. To understand the latter, it is necessary to consider the sorts of cases being pursued, and 
how these map onto wider policy concerns. In short, the consistent theme is the extent to which 
antitrust enforcement has aligned with, and reinforced, the regulatory process of market 
liberalisation. One sees this perhaps most obviously in the recurrent use of Article 9 case 
dispositions—which empower the Commission to accept behavioral or structural 
commitments, such as divestiture remedies, in lieu of findings of breach—in the energy sector, 
in a manner which arguably serves to compensate for the Commission’s comparative lack of 
legislative success here.122 From a substantive antitrust perspective, of greatest interest is the 
extent to which regulatory concerns have fed into two of the most prominent theories of harm 
applied in these sectors, namely, refusal to deal and margin squeeze. The frequent application 
of these theories is unsurprising, given that the sectors under scrutiny involve vertically 
integrated network utilities with natural monopoly segments. What is more remarkable, 
however, has been the Commission’s approach to the interpretation and development of the 
case theories in this context. 
Refusal to deal comprises the denial of access by dominant undertakings to strategically 
important market segments, in order to exclude competition in adjacent sectors. Under Article 
102, claimed refusals are assessed under the Bronner criteria, which require a demonstration 
of “exceptional circumstances” to establish abuse.123 What we see in the liberalisation context, 
in particular, is a willingness to map the antitrust interpretation of exceptionality onto the 
 
120 Including Cases COMP/37451—Deutsche Telekom (Decision of May 21, 2003); COMP/38784—Telefonica 
S.A. (broadband) (Decision of July 4, 2007); COMP/39525—Telekomunikacja Polska, Decision of 22 June 
2011; and AT.39523—Slovak Telekom (Decision of October 15, 2014). 
121 Including Cases COMP/37966—Distrigaz (Decision of October 11, 2007); COMP/39388—German 
electricity wholesale market (Decision of June 12, 2008); COMP/39.402—RWE Gas Foreclosure (Decision of 
June 12, 2009); COMP/39316—GDF foreclosure (Decision of December 3, 2009); COMP/39317—E.On gas 
foreclosure (Decision of May 4, 2010); COMP/39.315—ENI (Decision of September 29, 2010); 
COMP/39386—Long term electricity contracts in France, Decision of 17 March 2010; Case COMP/39.351—
Swedish Interconnectors (Decision of April 14, 2010); Case AT.39727—CEZ (Decision of April 10, 2013); 
Case AT.39767—BEH Electricity (Decision of October 16, 2015); Case AT.39816—Upstream gas supplies in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Decision of May 24, 2018); and AT.40461—DE/DK Interconnector (Decision of 
December 7, 2018). 
122 Discussed by Ralf Boscheck, The EU’s Third Internal Energy Market Legislative Package: Victory of 
Politics over Economic Rationality? 32 WORLD COMP. 593 (2009). 
123 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. 
KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. 
KG EU:C:1998:569. The central element of the Bronner legal test for abusive refusal to supply is the existence 
of an “indispensable” input or infrastructure controlled by the dominant undertaking, access to which is 
objectively necessary for rivals to compete in adjacent markets. 
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parameters of the underlying sector-specific regulatory regime—which, as argued above, 
reflects an essentially ideological understanding of the optimal operation of such markets.  
In Telekomunikacja Polska, for instance, the impugned refusal consisted of failure to 
comply effectively with access obligations under the EU framework for telecommunications 
liberalisation. Although the conduct had been sanctioned by the domestic regulator, the 
Commission124 and the Court125 had little difficulty in construing the regulatory violation, 
additionally, as an antitrust offence. In ENI, the alleged refusal included failure to anticipate 
likely future requests for access and expand capacity accordingly, behavior that was 
conceptualized as “strategic underinvestment” in the defendant’s gas transport 
infrastructure.126 Such an approach similarly has a distinct regulatory flavor, suggesting that 
the special responsibility of dominant firms extends to forecasting and promoting future market 
development. More recently, in Slovak Telekom,127 the General Court confirmed one of the 
contentious “Telefonica exceptions,”128 to the effect that regulatory supply duties may function 
a proxy for indispensability, thus negating the need to consider non-duplicability from an 
antitrust perspective.129 Moreover, the Court “suggested” that Bronner is irrelevant in 
situations of constructive refusal.130 Such an approach makes little sense when measured 
against the cogent competition policy concerns that motivated the regulatory restraint implicit 
in Bronner,131 and is at odds with that advocated in the Commission’s own Article 102 
guidelines.132 Yet it was vigorously advanced by the Commission in its earlier infringement 
decision, and defended by it on appeal. Each of these cases thus ably illustrates how the 
Commission’s enthusiasm for deploying antitrust to “correct” the process of liberalisation at 
Member State-level may prompt an expansion of the relevant competition provisions to 
account for the particularities of the underlying regulatory framework—creating, however, a 
risk of distortive effects for the competition rules longer-term.133  
 
124 COMP/39525—Telekomunikacja Polska (Decision of June 22, 2011). 
125 Case T-486/11 Orange Polska v Commission EU:T:2015:1002, confirmed in Case C-123/16 P Orange 
Polska v Commission EU:C:2018:590. 
126 See, e.g., Giorgio Monti, Managing the Intersection of Utilities Regulation and EC Competition Law (2008) 
4 COMP. L. REV. 123. 
127 Case T-851/14 Slovak Telekom v Commission EU:T:2018:929. 
128 Originally suggested in Case COMP/38784—Telefonica S.A. (broadband) (Decision of July 4, 2007). See 
Damien Geradin, Refusal to Supply and Margin Squeeze: A Discussion of Why the 'Telefonica Exceptions' are 
Wrong, TILEC DISCUSSION PAPER No. 2011-009. 
129 Slovak Telekom, paras. 117-21. 
130 Slovak Telekom, para. 126. 
131 Discussed, most notably, in the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner 
EU:C:1998:264, paras. 55-62. 
132 ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES, para. 79. 
133 Risks associated with the “instrumentalization” of competition law are discussed in-depth by PIERRE 
LAROUCHE, COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2000), 353-56. 
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Margin squeeze is a second theory of recurrent application.134 Given its conceptual 
proximity to refusal to deal, this may be expected, and indeed the Commission’s Article 102 
guidance assessed margin squeeze as a form of constructive refusal.135 Starting with Deutsche 
Telekom,136 however, the Commission has treated margin squeeze as a distinct category of 
abusive behavior, an approach subsequently granted the imprimatur of the Court.137 A logical 
but unsensible consequence, confirmed in the reference case of TeliaSonera, is that the Bronner 
criteria do not determine the existence of a margin squeeze.138 Conceivably, a dominant firm 
may have an absolute right to deny access to its infrastructure under Article 102; but if it 
chooses to deal, it becomes subject to a positive duty to ensure a “fair” spread between 
wholesale and retail prices. Notably, this unsatisfactory state of affairs was actively advocated 
by the Commission in its intervention in TeliaSonera, premised on the (patently spurious) 
argument that, otherwise, any application of Article 102 would be contingent upon identifying 
an indispensable input.139 This pared down legal standard was then applied by the Commission 
in Slovak Telekom, where the muddled reasoning of TeliaSonera was again deployed to support 
the “suggestion” that constructive refusals escape the established Bronner conditions.140 
What both strands of case-law demonstrate is that, although the Commission may be 
happy in principle to tie its hands with more demanding assessment criteria in line with the 
“more economic approach,” when it comes to actually applying competition law to address 
anticompetitive behavior in liberalising markets, it is almost indecently eager to escape these 
shackles. Moreover, the thrust of the Commission’s approach is that the competition rules 
coincide precisely with requirements under the liberalisation framework. Yet where the 
Commission disagrees with how the national regulator has interpreted its task of liberalisation, 
defendants receive little credit for having complied with the directions of the latter, as Deutsche 
Telekom illustrated.141 The most obvious takeaway is the extent to which (perceived) public 
interest considerations may influence both the intensity and the ambition of antitrust 
enforcement. Yet in the Commission’s eagerness to police the task of liberalisation through 
competition law, there is little consideration of whether the rules emerging represent best 
 
134 See, e.g., Deutsche Telekom, Telefonica, RWE, Slovak Telekom, and in the context of rail, Case AT.39678—
Deutsche Bahn I (Decision of December 18, 2013). 
135 ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES, para. 80. 
136 Case COMP/37451—Deutsche Telekom (Decision of May 21, 2003). 
137 Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission EU:T:2008:101, confirmed in Case C-280/08 P Deutsche 
Telekom v Commission EU:C:2010:603. 
138 Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige EU:C:2011:83, paras. 54-59. 
139 TeliaSonera, para. 58. 
140 Slovak Telekom, para. 126. 
141 See text accompanying fn. 104 above. 
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practice for the latter discipline as a whole—and in particular, whether these interpretations 
continue to make sense once removed from the protection of the Commission, and applied by 
a diverse range of public and private enforcers within the increasingly decentralized EU 
system. 
 
(ii) Competition law and the Pharmaceutical Sector 
 A second area of concentrated enforcement is the pharmaceutical sector.142 Multiple 
competing public interests loom large here, summarized by former Competition Commissioner 
Kroes as impacting both “the health and finances of Europe’s citizens and governments.”143 
Securing access to necessary medicine for patients has an inescapable public health dimension. 
Yet in Europe, where the final payer is often the State, access may be less a question of 
availability and more of cost to straitened public purses. Merely pushing down prices cannot 
be the sole objective, however. Not only is the pharmaceutical sector highly dependent on 
costly R&D efforts to generate a pipeline of innovative new products that deliver 
improvements for patient health. Moreover, the health of the pharmaceutical sector itself raises 
industrial policy considerations in light of its key role within the EU economy. Thus, there are 
few obvious answers to competition problems in these markets, as the Commission’s 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, concluded in 2009, acknowledged.144 
The preceding subsection described how public interest considerations underpinned a 
markedly expansive approach to an established theory of harm (refusal to deal) in liberalising 
market segments. In the pharmaceutical sector, by contrast, the public interests at stake have 
prompted significant legal innovation, resulting in the recognition of more novel theories which 
capture particular types of strategic behavior. This subsection considers two: the treatment of 
“pay-for-delay” agreements and “regulatory gaming” practices. Notably, both police the switch 
from patent protection to generic competition, and thus align with the balancing of multiple 
competing public interests in pharmaceutical cases: the end of patent protection marks the end 
of the period during which originator companies can plausibly claim a legitimate “monopoly 
reward” for successful innovation, while the introduction of generic competition usually 
generates significant downward pricing pressure. 
 
142 Describing most recent enforcement efforts, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON COMPETITION 
ENFORCEMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR (2009-17). EUROPEAN COMPETITION AUTHORITIES WORKING 
TOGETHER FOR AFFORDABLE AND INNOVATIVE MEDICINEs, COM(2019) 17 final (January 28, 2019). 
143 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ANTITRUST: SHORTCOMINGS IN PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR REQUIRE FURTHER 
ACTION (press release of July 8, 2009). 
144 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY FINAL REPORT (July 8, 2009). 
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The term “pay-for-delay” refers to a broad category of agreements pursuant to which 
generic companies consent to delay or even abandon market entry in exchange for payment 
from the incumbent originator.145 Such agreements tend to emerge shortly before successful 
proprietary medicines come off patent, as originators seek to extend de facto the duration of 
patent protection—and attendant inflated profits. In Lundbeck, decided in 2013, the 
Commission held for the first time that “pay-for-delay” agreements may violate Article 101.146 
The anticompetitive potential of such arrangements is relatively uncontroversial,147 and, that 
same year, the US Supreme Court similarly agreed that “pay-for-delay” may violate Sherman 
Act §1, following a “rule of reason” assessment.148 What was more unusual about Lundbeck 
was that the Commission had proceeded on the basis that relevant restraints comprised object 
restrictions under Article 101. Yet the “by object” category is, in principle, reserved for only 
the most obviously, inherently harmful forms of coordination.149 Such a characterization is 
arguably less clear-cut in the context of “pay-to-delay,” where excluded rivals constitute 
merely potential competitors at the time of the agreement, where successful entry even absent 
the arrangement is not a given, where there are (sometimes dubious) intellectual property rights 
at stake, and where condemnation of the agreement may conflict with the right to effective 
judicial protection. 
Yet the approach in Lundbeck is easier to support to the extent that the relevant “legal 
and economic context” of the restraint is read broadly to encompass wider public interest 
dimensions. This certainly seems to have been the approach of the General Court in Lundbeck 
in upholding the object characterization,150 in which it acknowledged and defended the role of 
generic entry in prompting often-dramatic regulated price cuts in the pharmaceutical sector.151 
It also expressed skepticism about the robustness of certain domestic patents, primly repeating 
that “it is in the public interest to eliminate any obstacle to economic activity which may arise 
where a patent was granted in error.”152 Accordingly, contra the argument that Lundbeck is 
incompatible with the restrictive understanding of the object category endorsed in Cartes 
 
145 “Pay-for-delay” often occurs in the context of patent litigation by the originator in an effort to use any 
existing or expiring patents to resist entry: hence the alternative moniker of “reverse payment settlements”. 
146 Case AT. 39226—Lundbeck (Decision of June 19, 2013). 
147 See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design 
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006), and Frank Maier-Rigaud, Nathan Blalock & Oliver Gannon, Reverse 
Payments: An EU and US Perspective, in PABLO FIGUEROA & ALEJANDRO GUERRERO (EDS.), EU LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND TRADE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR (2019). 
148 F.T.C. v. Actavis Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013). 
149 See fn. 60 above and accompanying text. 
150 Case T-472/13 Lundbeck v Commission EU:T:2016:449. 
151 Lundbeck, para. 385. 
152 Lundbeck, paras. 119, 390 and 487. 
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Bancaires,153 the case can instead be seen as a nuanced exposition of the latter approach. Thus, 
even if, strictly speaking, Article 101 cannot police the protection of human health, the latter 
may shift our perception of the underlying legal context or render the anticipated economic 
harm more compelling. While Lundbeck is on further appeal,154 the object treatment of “pay-
for-delay” has been confirmed by the General Court in Servier,155 in which the Commission 
notably hedged its bets by treating the relevant restraints as restrictions both by object and 
effect.156 
 A second area of legal innovation involves so-called “regulatory gaming.” This refers 
to the exploitation of pro-competitive or neutral governmental regulations, which are misused 
by private undertakings for exclusionary purposes.157 The challenge from an antitrust 
perspective is that, frequently, the defendant’s behavior complies with the letter of the 
underlying regime, though not its spirit. Thus, regulatory gaming raises questions of the extent 
to which competition law should second-guess the approach of other regulatory frameworks or 
attempt to correct putatively “broken” regimes.  
The most prominent example in EU law arose precisely in the pharmaceutical sector, 
where AstraZeneca was held have violated Article 102 through conduct intended to prolong 
the duration of patent protection for its blockbuster ulcer medicine, Losec.158 The abusive 
behavior comprised two prongs. First, the defendant made misrepresentations to national patent 
authorities, which enabled it to obtain “supplementary protection certificates” (SPCs) which 
extended patent life. Second, it strategically withdrew marketing authorization for Losec 
capsules, thus denying generic entrants a piggyback licensing procedure; and in tandem sought 
to migrate existing patient-users to tablet form, which retained patent protection. The difficulty 
was that such behavior was either permitted by the underlying regulatory regime,159 or 
 
153 See fn. 25 above. The treatment of the by object category in Lundbeck is criticized as incompatible with the 
ruling in Cartes Bancaires by, inter alia, Sven Gallasch, Activating Actavis in Europe—the proposal for a 
‘structured effects-based’ analysis for pay-to-delay settlements, 36 LEGAL STUDIES 683, 688-693 (2016). 
154 Pending Case C-591/16 P Lundbeck v Commission. 
155 Case T-691/14 Servier and Others v Commission EU:T:2018:922. 
156 Case AT.39612—Perindopril (Servier) (Decision of July 9, 2014). 
157 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009). 
158 Case COMP/37507—Generics/Astra Zeneca (Decision of June 15, 2005). Upheld on appeal in Cases T-
321/05 AstraZeneca EU:T:2010:266 and C-457/10 P AstraZeneca EU:C:2012:770. 
159 Withdrawal of marketing authorization was expressly foreseen within the then-applicable EU-level 
legislation, namely, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 65/65/EEC OF 26 JANUARY 1965 ON THE APPROXIMATION OF 
PROVISIONS LAID DOWN BY LAW, REGULATION OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION RELATING TO PROPRIETARY 
MEDICINAL PRODUCTS (OJ 22/369, 9.2.1965). The Court of Justice moreover accepted that “the preparation by 
an undertaking, even in a dominant position, of a strategy whose object it is to minimize the erosion of its sales 
and to enable it to deal with competition from generic products is legitimate and is part of the normal 
competitive process, provided that the conduct envisaged does not depart from practices coming within the 
scope of competition on the merits”: see Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca, para. 129. 
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implicitly facilitated.160 Thus, the putative actus reus in each instance was conduct that 
represented “normal” business behavior within the market concerned.  
What is notable about AstraZeneca, therefore, and where the underlying public interest 
considerations came to the fore, is the extent to which the existence of the abuse hinged on the 
defendant’s anticompetitive intention (or “mens rea”).161 As explained in Section III, in 
principle the antitrust rules depend upon an objective determination of the impact on 
competition, actual or anticipated, of the relevant conduct. Yet although AstraZeneca 
reaffirmed the orthodoxy that anticompetitive intent is not a necessary requirement under 
Article 102, here the defendant’s perceived objectives proved determinative of its abusive 
behavior. So, for instance, the fact that AstraZeneca exercised its otherwise lawful right to 
withdraw its marketing authorizations precisely to frustrate generic competition served to 
transform outwardly ordinary and permissible behavior into an antitrust violation. Yet every 
firm wishes ultimately to exclude competitors, in the sense of increasing its own market share, 
hence the limited utility of mens rea-esque concepts in the antitrust sphere. What thus 
distinguished AstraZeneca, arguably, was the wider context and more profound ramifications 
of excluding generic competition: in particular, the harmful consequences for national health 
systems, a concern that was considered in detail in the Commission infringement decision.162 
Much as in the context of “pay-for-delay,” the underlying public interest considerations did not 
dispense with the need for antitrust assessment; but rather were brought to bear in shaping and 
justifying an ambitious application of the competition rules.  
Yet the pharmaceutical sector also provides an important reminder of the continuing 
need to root even a purposive interpretation of the competition rules within the existing legal 
framework. This is seen in the fate of Servier, the second decision in which the Commission 
condemned regulatory gaming.163 While, as noted, the General Court confirmed the Article 
101 aspects, the Article 102 claim fell at the first hurdle, as the Court was unpersuaded of the 
robustness of the Commission’s market definition exercise. Absent dominance, Servier’s 
putatively anticompetitive unilateral behavior was immune from scrutiny, regardless of the 
public interests at stake. Thus, the soft influence of the public interest has unavoidable limits 
in the antitrust sphere. 
 
 
160 National patents offices were not required to, and typically did not, verify information submitted by 
applicants to obtain SPCs. 
161 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca, para. 359. 
162 Case COMP/A.37.507/F3—AstraZeneca (Decision of June 15, 2005), paras.112-38. 
163 See fns. 155-156 above. 
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(iii) Competition law and the Digital Economy 
 The third and final example is a more recent focus on competition problems within the 
digital economy. The inescapable rise of Big Tech, coupled with the comparative absence of 
effective regulation within the digital sphere, has led to urgent calls (often from outside the 
antitrust community) for more aggressive enforcement against the digital giants.164 In the EU, 
these challenges are inextricably tied up with the “fairness mantra”165 associated with the 
tenure of Commissioner Vestager at DG Competition. In embracing the argument that 
competition law and policy are directed towards securing “a Europe that gives everyone a fair 
chance,”166 Commissioner Vestager has not only aligned this area of EU law with wider policy 
concerns about the optimal future development of the social market economy.167 Moreover, the 
sheer breadth of the fairness concept—including, inter alia, the right of “all companies—large 
and small—[to] a fair, fighting chance to succeed on their merits,”168 “fair pay:169 for workers, 
and a duty on undertakings to pay “their fair share of tax”170—inevitably calls into question the 
Commission’s commitment to a “more economic approach,” with its ostensible single-minded 
focus on behavior that results in anticompetitive foreclosure.171 
What is interesting about the themes highlighted by Commissioner Vestager is how 
these transcend even a “big is bad” understanding of competition policy. Instead, she has drawn 
upon a broad range of public interest concerns associated with the emergence of hugely 
powerful, increasingly ubiquitous, and apparently unregulatable digital platforms. These 
 
164 See fn. 12 above. For more ‘mass media’ accounts, see Regulators across the West are in need of a shake-up, 
THE ECONOMIST, November 15, 2018, and Big Tech has moved from offering utopia to selling dystopia, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, November 3, 2019. 
165 See Vestager’s ‘fairness’ mantra rattles through EU competition law, MLEX, November 15, 2016, 
https://mlexmarketinsight.com/insights-center/editors-picks/antitrust/europe/vestagers-fairness-mantra-
rattles-through-eu-competition-law. Insightful if brief discussions are Alfonso Lamadrid, Competition Law as 
Fairness, 8 J. EUR. COMP. LAW & PRACTICE 147 (2017), and Damien Gerard, Fairness in EU Competition 
Policy: Significance and Implications, 9 J. EUR. COMP. LAW & PRACTICE 211 (2018). 
166 MARGRETE VESTAGER, SETTING INNOVATION FREE (speech of October 12, 2017). 
167 See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WHITE PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE COM(2017)2025 (March 1, 
2017). 
168 MARGRETE VESTAGER, PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPE (speech of November 20, 2015). 
169 MARGRETE VESTAGER, BUILDING A FAIRER AND MORE SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY (speech of September 19, 
2018), and MAKING FASHION SUSTAINABLE (speech of May 15, 2018). 
170 The first reference to this variety of unfairness was in MARGRETE VESTAGER, INDEPENDENCE IS NON-
NEGOTIABLE (speech of June 18, 2015); see also THE EU STATE AID RULES: WORKING TOGETHER FOR FAIR 
COMPETITION (speech of June 3, 2016); HELPING PEOPLE COPE WITH TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (speech of 
November 21, 2017); COMPETITION AND A FAIR DEAL FOR CONSUMERS ONLINE (speech of April 26, 2018); 
PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN A DIGITAL WORLD (speech of December 4, 2018); AN INNOVATIVE DIGITAL FUTURE 
(speech of 8 February 2018); and A DIGITAL FUTURE THAT WORKS FOR EUROPEANS (SPEECH OF 27 AUGUST 
2019). 
171 See fn. 171 above. 
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include data privacy,172 the increasing pervasiveness of algorithmic decision-making,173 the 
problems of adequately taxing digital services,174 the labor rights of vulnerable workers who 
provide services through digital platforms,175 and, ultimately, the threats to the fabric of our 
democracy that may be posed by the shift from public to private control of large areas of the 
economy.176 The fact that such themes plainly go beyond her remit as Competition 
Commissioner received tacit acknowledgement upon her re-nomination for a second term in 
September 2019, when Commissioner Vestager was given the additional mandate of securing 
“a Europe fit for the digital age.”177 Yet the rhetoric of fairness, even at its most ambitious, is 
by no means decoupled from the bread-and-butter of her antitrust enforcer role. Commissioner 
Vestager has explained the logic as such: 
[I]f we value an open economy, and a liberal society, we have to show that those values 
benefit everyone, not just the select few[.] So if we want to show that our society treats 
everyone fairly, however big or small, we need to prove it in the market.178 
It is in recent enforcement efforts within the digital economy that, arguably, we see these ideas 
play out most clearly. 
The Commission, of course, has a rich history of robust enforcement within the “new” 
economy, including infringement decisions against Microsoft in 2004179 and Intel in 2009.180 
Both involved the application of well-established rules to more novel market situations—tying 
and refusal to deal in Microsoft, exclusive dealing in Intel—and both culminated in what were, 
at the time, record-breaking fines for violations of Article 102. These cases may thus be viewed 
as ‘setting the scene’ for the trio of infringement decisions pursued against Google—
Shopping,181 Android,182 and AdSense183—since 2017. Yet these later cases mark a more 
 
172 MARGRETE VESTAGER, MAKING DATA WORK FOR US (speech of September 9, 2016); and SETTING 
INNOVATION FREE (speech of October 12, 2017). 
173 MARGRETE VESTAGER, BUNDESKARTELLAMT 18TH CONFERENCE ON COMPETITION, BERLIN (speech of 
March 16, 2017), and CLEARING THE PATH FOR INNOVATION (speech of November 7, 2017). 
174 MARGRETE VESTAGER, FOR A FAIR TAXATION SYSTEM IN EUROPE (speech of November 28, 2017), and 
‘WORKING TOGETHER FOR FAIR TAXATION’ (speech of September 2, 2016). 
175 MARGRETE VESTAGER, BUILDING A POSITIVE DIGITAL WORLD (speech of October 29, 2019). 
176 MARGRETE VESTAGER, DEALING WITH POWER IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD: ECONOMY, TECHNOLOGY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS (speech of March 19, 2019). 
177 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE VON DER LEYEN COMMISSION: FOR A UNION THAT STRIVES FOR MORE (press 
release of September 10, 2019. 
178 MARGRETE VESTAGER, COMPETITION AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET (speech of September 15, 2016). 
179 Case COMP/37792—Microsoft (Decision of March 24, 2004). 
180 Case COMP/37990—Intel (Decision of May 13, 2009). 
181 Case AT.39740—Google Search (Shopping) (Decision of June 27, 2017). 
182 Case AT.40099—Google Android (Decision of July 18, 2018). 
183 Case AT.40411—Google Search (AdSense) (Decision of March 20, 2019). 
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muscular development of the antitrust rules in several ways, which, we suggest, is inspired in 
part by a perceived need to address broader public interest concerns. 
First, the most immediately striking feature is the size of the fines imposed: more than 
€8 billion in total across the three Google decisions, including a record-breaking fine of €4.34 
billion for Android alone.184 It is difficult to avoid the impression that these very high fines are 
a deliberate policy choice, set at such an elevated level precisely to demonstrate the willingness 
of the Commission to intervene against market actors perceived to pose a threat to the public 
interest.185 Such high fines were, moreover, enabled by the policy choice to pursue the cases 
as Article 7 infringement decisions rather than Article 9 commitments.186 This was despite 
overtures towards settlement in Android,187 and more remarkably, despite three rounds of 
ultimately unsuccessful market-testing of proposed commitments in Shopping (which, 
however, preceded Commissioner Vestager’s arrival at DG Competition).188 A similar “public 
interest” dimension is discernible in the Commission’s 2016 determination that Apple was 
required to repay €13 billion in uncollected taxes to Ireland for breach of the State aid rules,189 
a decision the Commissioner admitted was motivated by a perceived need to “do something” 
within the limited powers available to the Commission to address public anger over tax 
injustice.190 Even if the subject-matter of these decisions is often far removed from the focus 
of public anxiety regarding the digital economy, such cases nonetheless perform an important 
demonstrative function, setting the EU up as “the determinator,”191 prepared to rein in Big Tech 
in the public interest. 
The influence of the public interest is also evidence in the emergence of self-
preferencing as the most prominent theory of harm in the digital sphere. Self-preferencing 
refers to situations whereby a digital platform gives “preferential treatment to one’s own 
products or services when they are in competition with products and services provided by other 
 
184 Shopping saw a fine of €2.42 billion in 2017, with a fine of €1.49 billion for the AdSense breach in 2019. 
185 An impression undiminished by the fact that the Android fine conveniently totalled USD$5 billion when 
reported worldwide: see, e.g., Why Did the European Commission Fine Google Five Billion Dollars?, THE NEW 
YORKER (July 20, 2018), and Google Appeals $5 Billion EU Fine in Android Case, THE WALL STREET STREET 
JOURNAL, October 9, 2018. 
186 Pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, investigations are concluded without any formal finding of 
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entities using the platform.”192 It was the crux of the prohibited behavior in Shopping, can 
arguably been seen as the underlying concern in Android,193 and is the subject of on-going 
investigations involving Amazon Marketplace194 and Apple iTunes.195 While in Shopping, the 
Commission disclaimed any novelty for self-preferencing as a theory of harm,196 the case-law 
cited to support its established status fell considerably short.197 A cynic might also observe that 
novelty would have been an inconvenient obstacle insofar as the Commission was determined 
to impose a (then) record-breaking fine.198 In their report on Competition Policy for the Digital 
Era, the Commission’s expert panel on digital markets went even further, arguing for a reverse 
burden of proof in certain instances whereby the platform would “bear the burden of proving 
that self-preferencing has no long-run exclusionary effects on product markets.”199 
Yet self-preferencing is of interest beyond the mere fact that its novelty demonstrates 
legal innovation in response to broader public concerns about the digital economy. The theory 
has a distinct regulatory quality, which chimes with calls for the aggressive application of 
competition law to provide an ad hoc tool for regulating the digital economy. The 
Commission’s expert panel thus identified a category of platforms which perform “a rule-
setting function,” whereby platforms “act as regulators, setting up the rules and institutions 
through which their users interact.”200 In such circumstances, the authors proposed an 
overarching duty on dominant platforms to ensure that “competition on their platforms is fair, 
unbiased, and pro-users,”201 a specific application of which is the reverse burden of proof for 
self-preferencing set out above.202 The notion that dominant platforms have a positive duty to 
ensure “fair” outcomes for rivals, through for instance modifying the manner in which they 
display competing services, has inescapable parallels to more traditional forms of utilities 
regulation. Yet whereas the latter has typically been contingent upon the existence of 
bottleneck monopolies which render effective competition otherwise impossible, both the 
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Commission and its expert panel expressly disclaimed any necessary connection between the 
theory of self-preferencing and the case-law on refusal to supply.203 The focus instead on 
“strategic market status”204 thus aligns with broader academic concerns about the role that 
digital platforms play as gatekeepers within contemporary markets, and indeed contemporary 
society more broadly.205 Similarly, the suggestion to relax the conventional antitrust concern 
with error cost by erring on the side of prohibiting potentially anticompetitive conduct in 
concentrated digital markets,206 is consistent with broader public skepticism about digital 
market power. 
Accordingly, what we see in the digital economy is how broader public interest 
concerns feed into discussion of the optimal approach to competition policy, with, moreover, 
some evidence from recent enforcement practice of the redirection of the latter to provide a 
more muscular tool to regulate digital dominance. There are, once again, inherent limits to such 
an approach, typified by the “serious doubts” expressed by the Dusseldorf Higher Regional 
Court207 when considering the Bundeskartellamt’s much-debated decision to sanction alleged 
data protection breaches by Facebook as a violation of the German rules on abuse of market 
conduct.208 That is, competition law remains competition law, and thus provides an inapt tool 
to regulate, for instance, fake news or discriminatory algorithmic decision-making, not merely 
from a legitimacy but also an effectiveness perspective. But it is indisputable that the arguments 
being raised transcend purely technical questions of antitrust policy—and it is increasingly 
 
203 Shopping, para. 651; and DIGITAL ERA REPORT, p.66. 
204 The language used in COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION. REPORT 
OF THE DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL (2019), p.42. 
205 See, e.g., Orla Lynskey, Regulating “Platform Power,” LSE LAW, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY WORKING 
PAPERS 1/2017; Lina Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2019); and 
Rupprecht Podszun, Digital Ecosystems, Decision-Making, Competition and Consumers—On the Value of 
Autonomy for Competition (March 19, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3420692 . 
206 DIGITAL ERA REPORT, pp.50-52. 
207 Alfonso Lamadrid, The Suspension of the Bundeskartellamt’s Facebook Decision- Part I: What the Order 
Actually Says, CHILLIN’ COMPETITION BLOG (September 3, 2019), 
https://chillingcompetition.com/2019/09/03/the-suspension-of-the-bundeskartellamts-facebook-decision-
part-i-what-the-order-actually-says/. The Regional Court has suspended the operation of the decision pending a 
full hearing of the appeal. 
208 Bundeskartellamt Decision of 6 February 2019, B6-22/16—Facebook. For a sample of the rather disparate 
views on this case, see Maximilian N. Volmar & Katharina O. Helmach, Protecting consumers and their data 
through competition law? Rethinking abuse of dominance in light of the Federal Cartel Office’s Facebook 
investigation, 14 EUR. COMP. J. 195 (2018); Marco Botta & Klaus Wiedemann, EU Competition Law 
Enforcement Vis-À-Vis Exploitative Conducts in the Data Economy—Exploring the Terra Incognita (2018) 
MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION & COMPETITION RESEARCH PAPER No. 18-08; Viktoria Robertson, 
The Theory of Harm in the Bundeskartellamt’s Facebook Decision, COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL 
(March 2019); Rupprecht Podszun, After Facebook: What to Expect from Germany, 10 J. EUR. COMP. LAW & 
PRACTICE 69 (2019); and Giuseppe Colangelo & Mariateresa Maggiolino, Antitrust Über Alles. Whither 
Competition Law After Facebook? 42 World Comp. 355 (2019). 
	33 
difficult to maintain that such concerns are not reflected in at least the tenor of policy debate 
with respect to the digital economy, if not also the application of the antitrust rules in practice. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
 Debates regarding the treatment of public interest under the EU competition rules are 
caught between several contrasting impetuses. Competition law is focused on ensuring 
effective market competition, and in the EU, protecting “competition as such.” Yet most people 
would accept that, in the final analysis, markets should serve the wider public interest and not 
vice versa. It is, accordingly, difficult to maintain that competition law should be applied and 
developed with its eyes closed to non-economic public interest concerns. Yet there is often 
acute difficulty, at least in the EU, in identifying a single set of legitimate or approved public 
interests that merit accommodation within the competition framework. Moreover, while this 
article has focused primarily on the “centralized” application of the competition rules by the 
Commission, within an increasingly decentralized enforcement landscape, such public interest 
claims may take on greater urgency, but also have greater disruptive or distortive potential. 
This article has argued that it may be inferred from recent enforcement in three distinct 
segments that the considerations at issue transcended an inflexible concern with “competition 
as such.” The examples surveyed, however, do not tell a clear and consistent story about when 
and how public interest concerns can and should be accommodated. In the context of the 
network industries, for example, the Commission has used antitrust enforcement to pursue a 
rather singular vision of how such markets should be structured and ought to operate. Yet the 
available empirical evidence suggests that not all consumers are likely to benefit,209 and that 
the advisability of unbundling policies may vary significantly between different national 
markets.210 In the pharmaceutical sector, it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the root cause 
of the competition problems discussed above is, in many instances, the poor practices of 
national patent offices and other domestic regulatory agencies. Thus competition enforcement, 
instead, became a kind of “proxy war” in such cases, fought to tackle market problems outside 
the purview of the Commission’s regulatory jurisdiction. An inescapable paradox of calls for 
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greater intervention in the digital economy, moreover, is the underlying assumption that the 
public has a set of concerns about firm size which are not expressed in its market behavior:211 
that is, if we the public are so concerned about the omnipresence of the tech giants, then why 
do we keep using these services when other options are available?  
At its core, EU competition law reflects a persistent, though by no means uncontentious, 
belief that open and competitive markets, integrated across the Member States, are the best 
means to further public interest objectives more broadly. But that does not mean, however, that 
EU competition law is immune to wider public interest concerns. Non-competition 
considerations can affect our understanding of how markets work, or shape our approach to the 
derogations that exist within the competition system. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly 
in practice, the fact that compelling parallel public interests may be at stake can influence the 
underlying calculus of whether antitrust intervention is merited in a particular instance and how 
vigorously it should be pursued.  
Yet competition law is not a particularly nimble tool by which to pursue such interests 
more directly as a standalone concern. Competition law can break up cartels that seek to delay 
green innovation, for instance, or punish dominant drug-makers that block access to cheap 
generic versions of blockbuster medicines. But, conversely, it is an inapt mechanism by which 
to require firms to invest in sustainability, and there are cogent policy reasons why antitrust is 
generally reluctant to force generic-level pricing on originator pharma companies during the 
period of patent protection. Thus, competition law can and should be used to further the public 
interest, broadly construed, where the latter coincides with its overarching task of promoting 
beneficial social outcomes through the use of open and effective competition to control private 
power. But it is not a panacea for all contemporary ills, nor a lazy fallback that can be assumed 
to absolve other legal disciplines of the need to figure out how best to regulate problems that 
fall more squarely within their jurisdiction.  
Competition law and the public interest go hand in hand, as the quote that opened this 
article recognizes. But competition law alone cannot be enough to protect the range of interests 
that have been invoked in this context. There are, famously, “limits of antitrust,” and the extent 
to which these rules can be deployed in furtherance of non-competition-oriented yet socially 
valuable objectives is undoubtedly one such limit. Claims to the public interest are clearly 
cognizable within the EU competition framework, albeit typically through an approach of 
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carving out such concerns from application of the rules rather than accounting for non-
competition interests within the substance of the antitrust provisions. Whether the latter would 
be a good idea, or rather a slippery slope, is a provocative question largely beyond the scope 
of this article. What is clear, however, is that competition law can be part of the solution when 
it comes to addressing broader societal problems that extend beyond competition policy as 
such, but it would be naïve to think that it is the only or optimal solution here.  
 
 
 
